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TARGET BOARDS AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE US
Vivek Tata*
This article uses SEC filings, public reports, cases, and press
reports to examine how companies involved in transactions
for control approach review by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Due to the caseby-case nature of CFIUS review and the evolving and
politicized nature of the review process, it can be difficult to
assess how to approach interactions with CFIUS. In addition
to examining how companies allocate risks related to CFIUS
review, this article attempts to provide a short primer on how
target boards might assess and analyze the CFIUS process.

I. INTRODUCTION
During a four-week period in early 2016, action by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
or
rejection of three cross-border deal proposals. All three
involved investments from Chinese companies into the
United States. In the first situation, CFIUS blocked an
investment in Philips Lumileds, a U.S. subsidiary of Philips.1
In the second case, out of fear of CFIUS action, U.S.-based
proposal and accepted a lower bid from an American
company.2 In the third instance, a Chinese firm
*

J.D. 2016, Stanford Law School
Toby Sterling, U.S. Blocks Philips' $3.3 Billion Sale of
Lumileds to Asian Buyers, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2016, 1:59 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philips-lumileds-saleidUSKCN0V02D4.
2
See Press Release, Fairchild Semiconductor, Fairchild
Board of Directors Determines the Acquisition Proposal from China
Resources and Hua Capital is Not a Superior Proposal, (Feb.
1
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terminated its investment plan in a U.S. company after CFIUS
began an investigation. 3 These cases are but a snapshot of the
-border mergers and
acquisitions.
This article considers the impact of CFIUS review from
the perspective of a U.S. corporate board involved in a
transaction for control.4 This article begins with a brief
introduction into CFIUS, including its mechanisms for
control and brief history. Next, the article addresses CFIUS
concerns during the offer stage
how a target board should
approach a hostile offer from a foreign acquirer or how a
board might prepare itself for a friendly deal. Third, it looks
at key deal terms, such as the price and deal protection
measures a board should take to protect shareholders from the
costs of a blocked deal. As might be expected from a
committee focused on national security, CFIUS provides
relatively little in the way of public disclosure. This article
16,
2016),
https://www.fairchildsemi.com/about/pressreleases/Press-Release.html?id=20160216-fairchild-board-ofdirectors; Keith Bradsher & Paul Mozur, Political Backlash Grows
in Washington to Chinese Takeovers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/business/dealbook/chinafairchild-semiconductor-bid-rejected.html.
3
Arash Massoudi & James Fontanella-Khan, Tsinghua
kills $3.8bn investment plan in Western Digital, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2016). Tsinghua sought an approximately 15% stake in
Western Digital and requested a board seat. Id.
4
The threshold at which a transaction may result in
example, while shareholdings below 50% are not generally
considered controlling, a plaintiff can demonstrate actual control
through domination of corporate conduct by a minority shareholder.
See
1994) (holding a 43.3% minority shareholder to have had control over
business decisions). CFIUS, of course, is not bound by state
corporation law definitions of control and may look beyond these
shareholding thresholds. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.301(a) (2016)
(delineating which transactions are covered transactions). CFIUS

de
thresholds still trigger review.
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relies on SEC filings, corporate releases, cases, and press
reports to understand how boards have addressed CFIUSrelated challenges.

II. THE COMMITTEE S EVOLVING ROLE
CFIUS is a U.S.-based, interagency committee
comprised of key executive branch officials. 5 A transaction is
6

Notification is
voluntarily, but if parties fail to notify the Committee, it may
still take action, even after a deal is closed. 7 In general, CFIUS
raises three concerns for parties to a potentially covered
transaction. First, the review process takes a good deal of
time, which can delay an agreement: thirty days for the initial
review and forty-five days for the investigation, should one
be necessary.8 Regarding lengthy investigations, it is likely a
covered transaction will be investigated during the six-year
period from 2009 to 2014, CFIUS reported it conducted
investigations in nearly 40% of cases. 9 Second, the
Committee may indicate that certain mitigation measures are
necessary. 10 The Committee may also recommend that an
approved deal be unwound due to failures to comply with
mitigation requirements.11 Third, the Committee can
recommend that the President block or

5

SEE JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388,
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES
(CFIUS)
1 7
(2016),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf.
6
31 C.F.R § 800.301(a).
7
31 C.F.R § 800.401(a), (b) (2016).
8
31 C.F.R. § 800.501 506 (2016). For example, in the
2015. China's Anbang Insurance Gets U.S. Go-ahead for
$1.95 bln Waldorf Astoria Buy, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2015, 8:48 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/anbang-waldorfidUSB9N0TO01420150202.
9
JACKSON, supra note 5, at 25.
10
31 C.F.R. § 800.501 506.
11
E.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 6.
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suspend a transaction. 12 While it is extraordinarily rare for the
President to block a deal, the threat of such sanction forces
CFIUS may recommend divestiture, even post- closing.13
A history of CFIUS is beyond the scope of this article;
however, it is worth noting CFIUS has often been a lightning
rod for those concerned about the influence or threat posed by
particular foreign countries. The first major expansion of
-Florio provision, was
a reaction to concerns over Japanese takeovers of U.S.
firms.14 In 2007, concerns about Middle Eastern investors led
to the Foreign Investment and Security Act, which expanded
and homeland security concerns. 15
Over the past decade, observers conclude CFIUS has
begun to focus more on Chinese investments. 16 One
innocuous explanation is China is also the largest source of
12

31 C.F.R. § 800.506(b).
E.g., MEREDITH M. BROWN, RALPH C. FERRARA & PAUL
S. BIRD, TAKEOVERS: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS SUPPLEMENT 1 16 (2010) (describing the Polaris
Financial divestiture of IdenTrust and the Ralls case).
14
One deal of note involved a potential sale of Fairchild
Semiconductor to Fujitsu, which fell through in the face of political
opposition. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 3 4. See also Margaret L.
Merrill, Overcoming CFIUS Jitters: A Practical Guide for
Understanding the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 19 (2011). As described in the
introduction, Fairchild recently rejected an offer partially out of
concerns over CFIUS approval
perhaps due to experiencing deja
vu.
15
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110 49, § 4, 121 Stat. 246, 253 54 (2007).
16
See Shawn Donnan, US Reviews of Investments Made by
China Increase,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb.
19,
2016),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6ef4ffdc-d75b-11e5-969e9d801cf5e15b.html#axzz45OCDI376; see also Minxin Pei,
Washington Is Giving the Cold Shoulder to Chinese Investment,
FORTUNE
(Feb.
23,
2016,
10:43
AM),
http://fortune.com/2016/02/23/chinese-company-acquisitions-uscompanies/.
13

53
covered transactions, comprising nearly 20% of the total
covered transactions over the three-year period from 2012
through 2014. 17 However, members of Congress have raised
explicit concerns about Chinese investment, including
recommending publicly that CFIUS review specific deals. 18
Coupled with its record of investigation into Chinese
acquisitions, it is reasonable to conclude CFIUS is
particularly concerned about Chinese investment. It has
Astoria 19
company.20
The Committee will consider a range of threats in its
review. 21 Of particular importance is the relationship
between the target business and the acquiring country; for
example, it is hard to imagine a U.K. acquirer facing the same
in-depth investigation and public opposition as the Chinese
firm Shuanghui International when it acquired Smithfield
Foods.22 Critics of the deal specifically focused
17

JACKSON, supra note 5, at 19.
See Rebecca Spalding, Affymetrix Bid's China Ties Spark
National Security Talk, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2016, 6:57 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-21/affymetrixbid-s-china-ties-must-be-examined-congresswoman-says; see also
David Mclaughlin, Chinese Bid for Chicago Exchange Draws
Congressional Concern, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2016, 12:34 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-17/chinese-bidfor-chicago-exchange-draws-congressional-concern.
19
China's Anbang Insurance Gets U.S. Go-ahead for $1.95
bln Waldorf Astoria Buy, supra note 8.
20
SuccessFactors, Inc., Tender Offer Statement Amend. 7
(Schedule
TO/A)
(Dec.
16,
2011),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1402305/000119312512
019895/d268167dsctota.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2016).
21
See generally THEODORE H. M ORAN , T HREE T HREATS :
AN A NALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR T HE CFIUS PROCESS (2009)
(categorizing CFIUS threats into three groups: The first threat is the
foreign acquisition of key resources, such that the U.S. might become
reliant on a foreign power for essential goods or services. The second
threat involves the potential for transfer of technology or expertise to
a foreign power. The third threat involves the risk of espionage or
infiltration through acquisition of key assets.).
22
See Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Security Panel Clears
a Chinese Takeover of Smithfield Foods, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013,
18
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on concerns about Chinese food safety practices, 23 which
might not have been relevant for an acquirer based in another
country.

III. CFIUS CONSIDERATIONS IN THE OFFER
STAGE
When a U.S. board receives an offer from a foreign
acquirer, it should include CFIUS considerations in planning
its response. Whether or not the offer is solicited by the target,
the uncertainties created by the CFIUS process create both
opportunities and problems for target boards of directors.

A.

HOSTILE OFFERS

For boards facing a hostile offer, the prospect of CFIUS
1990, nearly half of the transactions CFIUS investigated were
24
Although this percentage
has dropped to approximately 20% over the past six years, 25
it is still quite high. A target board could, therefore, argue that
such transactions do not warrant

6:25
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/nationalsecurity-panel-approves-smithfield-sale-to-chinese-company/.
23
Press Release, Debbie Stabenow, Bipartisan Group of
Senators Urge Appropriate Oversight of Proposed Smithfield
Purchase
(June
20,
2013),
http://www.stabenow.senate.gov/news/bipartisan-group-ofsenators-urge-appropriate-oversight-of-proposed-smithfieldpurchase (last visited Oct. 28, 2016); Letter from Senators Max
Baucus and Orrin Hatch, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Fin., to the Hon.
Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Rep., and the Hon. Jacob Lew, U.S.
Sec.
of
the
Treasury
(June
21,
2013),
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062113%20Smithfi
eld%20Letter.pdf.
24
JACKSON, supra note 5, at 9.
25
Id. at 6. Note the percentage of withdrawn notices per year
fluctuates significantly
in 2012, it was close to 44%, but in 2014,
it was only 18%.
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serious consideration without a prohibitive premium and
onerous deal protection measures.
In the antitrust context, it is well established that an
informed board can decline an offer that is higher in nominal
terms but that creates real regulatory risk. 26 Given these cases,
it seems likely that a board which informs itself about the
risks involved with CFIUS review
mandatory divestitures,
delays, or even a blocked deal
would be protected by the
27
business judgment rule. Indeed, this is what Fairchild
Semiconductor recently concluded when it found a nominally
higher offer from a Chinese consortium did not constitute a
American company. 28 The board did not change its
-or- high-water
-

deal.29

Courts are also likely to draw a parallel with antitrust
mitigation measures in evaluating an offer. In In
26

See
CIV.A. 6623- VCN, 2013 WL 396202 at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013)
(informed and legitimate concerns about antitrust risk are sufficient
to presum
-faith business judgment); In re Cogent,
regulatory approvals relating to antitrust considerations presents a
In
re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781 n.6
considering any legitimate threat that the antitrust laws posed to the
consummation of any West Point
27
The business judgment rule is the presumption that
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action
t Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006)
(citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
28
Fairchild Semiconductor
Recommendation
Statement
(Schedule
14D-9A)
(Feb.
4,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1036960/000119312516
463934/d22910dsc14d9a.htm at 5.
29
Id.
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, the court refused to find an
implication of bad faith when the plaintiff asserted the board
could have done more to mitigate the antitrust concerns in a
rejected offer.30 Therefore, a board could, for example,
reasonably conclude selling off a lucrative government
contracting business in order to permit the sale of other assets
to a foreign investor would be too risky.
However, targets of hostile offers can use political
pressure to wear down a hostile bidder. The board may even
be able to rely on a preferred-domestic acquirer to carry out
the dirty work of lobbying for CFIUS scrutiny. In its battle
with the Chinese company China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC) over Unocal, Chevron issued a
government 31 and also lobbied politicians, resulting in
members of Congress urging a CFIUS investigation into the
competing offer. 32 CNOOC also hired lobbyists 33 and invited
review by CFIUS, but it was ultimately unsuccessful in its
attempts to fight back.34

B. BOARDS SEEKING FRIENDLY DEALS
A board seeking a friendly deal with a foreign investor
will need to plan ahead to increase the probability of CFIUS
approval. As a preliminary step, the company should identify
any ways in which its own business might trigger
30

CIV.A. 6623-VCN, 2013 WL 396202 at *9.
31
Press Release, Chevron Corp., Chevron Corporation
Statement
on
Unocal
Transaction
(June
22,
2005),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/00009501490500
0441/f10205ae425.htm.
32
Matt Pottinger, Russell Gold, et al., Cnooc Drops Offer
for Unocal, Exposing U.S.-Chinese Tensions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3,
2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112295744495102393.
33
Id.
34
Justin Blum, CNOOC Requests U.S. Security Scrutiny,
WASH. POST (June 28, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/27/AR2005062701501.html.
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CFIUS review. This has become harder to predict, and it
should encompass not only obvious triggers such as
government contracts but also particular assets such as
potentially sensitive real estate. 35
After reviewing its own business, the target board should
evaluate its potential acquirers. 36 As much as possible, the
target should seek out information on the acquiring company,
such as its sources of financing and connections to foreign
governments. 37 Some foreign companies, such as sovereign
wealth funds or companies known to have close ties to foreign
governments, appear to be more likely to trigger U.S.
scrutiny. For example, the House Intelligence Committee
recommended the Obama administration block acquisitions
by the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE.38
Additionally, transparency is a major concern for both
CFIUS and Congress. In Chongquing Casin Enterprise
Exchange, opponents of the deal cited the lack of
relationship to the Chinese government. 39 Even the CEO of
the exchange has stated that he does not know who owns the
company and that it is unclear whether the Chinese
government has a minority stake. 40 A target board seeking a
35

See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, Order Signed by the President Regarding the Acquisition
of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Ralls Corporation
(Sept. 28, 2012) (wind farms were located near U.S. naval facilities).
36
See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 27 28 (listing riskmitigating factors that CFIUS considers during investigation of
transactions).
37
See, e.g., id.
38
Id.
39
Letter from 47 Members of Congress to the Hon. Marisa Lao,
,
https://lynnjenkins.house.gov/uploads/Letter%20To%20CFIUS%2
0Re%20Chicago%20Stock%20Exchange%20Purchase.pdf.
40
Josh Rogin, Congress Wary of National Security Implications
of Chinese Deal for Chicago Stock Exchange, CHI. TRIB.
(Feb.
17,
2016,
8:29
AM),

58
foreign investor should therefore encourage a potential
acquirer to disclose this sort of information, rather than
permitting opponents to create costly regulatory hurdles due
to a lack of disclosure. 41
The target should also consider how to structure its sale
to best avoid CFIUS scrutiny. 42 A target may make itself more
attractive to foreign suitors by preemptively selling any
CFIUS-triggering aspect of the business, then selling the
remaining portion of the business to a foreign buyer. 43 To
maximize sale value, the parties will want to choreograph the
remain separate.44 In the bankruptcy auction for A123
Systems, for example, the bankers running the auction
contacted a U.S. company to bid for sensitive security assets,
while a Chinese company bid on the larger remainder. 45
Pairing these bids enabled the deal to proceed without
scrutiny.46

IV. DURING THE DEAL
A. DEAL PRICE
Once a deal is in process, a target board should work to
ensure that its shareholders are adequately compensated for
the regulatory risks posed by a foreign acquisition. This

http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-congress-chicagostock-exchange-sale-20160217-story.html.
41
See Merrill, supra note 14, at 36-40.
42
See, e.g., Julie Wernau, Navitas Key to Sale of A123 to
Chinese
Firm,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Jan.
30,
2013),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-30/business/ct-biz0130-navitas-20130130_1_navitas-systems-wanxiang-groupmicrosun-technologies.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
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t to compensate []
despite an approximately
48
Even
Institutional Shareholder Services, a leading advisory firm,
47

not adequately compensate for the regulatory

risk.49

described above.50
Chinese buyers use cash as consideration more than half
of the time, which may be attractive to stockholders. 51
However, a target board should inquire about the origin of the
-CNOOC battle, Chevron
-interest loans gave it an
unfair advantage, a claim echoed by political opponents of the
CNOOC bid.52 In another recent case, the
47

Shareholder Presentation, Unocal Corp., Unocal and
Chevron
(Rule
425
Filing)
(Aug.
3,
2005),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/00009501490500
0521/f10205ce425.htm.
48
David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Oil
Giant in Takeover Bid for U.S. Corporation, N.Y. TIMES (June 23,
2005)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/23/business/worldbusiness/chine
se-oil-giant-in-takeover-bid-for-us-corporation.html.
49
Press Release, Unocal Corp., Unocal Wins ISS Support
for
Merger
with
Chevron
(Aug.
1,
2005),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/containers/fix014/716039/000
089882205000892/aug1pr.txt.
50
supra note 28.
51
See Nisha Gopalan & Christopher Langner, Deal or No
Deal?,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
1,
2016,
2:11
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-04-01/deal-or-nodeal (noting 62% of Chinese buyers were to pay cash in failed or
withdrawn deals); see also Alfred Rappaport & Mark L. Sirower,
Stock or Cash? The Trade-Offs for Buyers and Sellers in Mergers
and Acquisitions, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.-Dec. 1999),
https://hbr.org/1999/11/stock-or-cash-the-trade-offs-for-buyersand-sellers-in-mergers-and-acquisitions (stating shareholders of
acquiring companies fare worse in stock transactions than they do
in cash transactions).
52
See Allen Sloan, Parent's Help Puts Cnooc Bid in
Different Light, WASH. POST (July 26, 2005) (stating that Chevron

60
fact that the foreign offeror, Origin Technology Corporation,
was a shell entity with unclear financing, was a reason for the
U.S. target, Affymetrix Incorporated, to choose a domestic
acquirer, notwithstanding a nominally higher bid.53

B. TERMINATION FEES AND CFIUS-RELATED COVENANTS
Aside from the pricing negotiation, the parties will need
to determine how to address the CFIUS process in the merger
agreement. There are three related decisions: the choice of
whether to notify the Committee, the value of any CFIUSrelated reverse termination fee, and the standard to which the
covenant.

1. NOTIFICATION
In most cases, parties who think they may fall within the
binding

has raised doubts about
bid and that it would receive
$4.5 billion from its parent company as a 30-year loan carrying a
3.5% interest rate); see also Press Release, Richard Pombo, Pombo
Statement on CNOOC Bid Withdrawal (Aug. 2, 2005),
https://votesmart.org/public-statement/119861/pombo-statementon-cnooc-bidbid withdrawal is good news for the free market); but see Kate
Linebaugh, How Favorable Is Oil Bid's Financing?, WALL ST. J.
(June
30,
2005,
12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112007688254773231
(arguing
the loans terms were not significantly advantageous to CNOOC).
53
See Kevin Miller & Megan Durisin, Affymetrix Rejects
$1.5 Billion Origin Bid, Favors Thermo, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20,
2016, 5:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201603-20/affymetrix-rejects-1-5-bid-billion-origin-bid-favors-fisher
(stating Affymetrix rej
instead continues to recommend Thermo Fisher for its planned
merger who offers $14 per share).

61
them to work together in notifying CFIUS. 54 On the other
hand, the parties may not want to work together because they
want to communicate confidence that the deal does not raise
any CFIUS issues. As described in greater detail below, there
is some evidence of such a signaling effect in the antitrust
context. In the ongoing Tianjin-Ingram Micro deal, for
example, the parties publicly decided not to notify, based on
Committee.55 A few months later, however, they reversed
56
In general, parties
involved in most of the major deals discussed in this article
did notify the Committee. Furthermore, many of those parties
had joint covenants, which required them to work together on
the CFIUS notification.

2. TERMINATION FEES & EFFORTS CLAUSES
A target board involved in a transaction likely to trigger
CFIUS scrutiny should require inclusion of a reverse
54

See Merrill, supra note 14, at 37-38 (explaining the
Committee has required joint-filings).
55
See generally Press Release, Ingram Micro Inc., Ingram
Micro Deal FAQs (Feb. 17, 2016), http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=98566&p=hnagroup (such a move is risky;
some commenters have suggested part of the reason the 3Com bid
failed was that the acquirers did not voluntarily notify until the
Committee was already interested in the transaction); Merrill, supra
note 14, at 39 n.228. See Vipal Monga, Ingram Micro To Submit $6
Billion Tianjin Tianhai Deal for CFIUS Review, WALL ST.
J.
(July 21,
2016,
5:19
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2016/07/21/ingram-micro-to-submit-6billion-tianjin-tianhai-deal-for-cfius-review/ (stating the company
had previously indicated it did not expect to go before CFIUS but
then reversed course).
56
Monga, supra note 55.

62
termination fee provision in the agreement. This fee will be
enforceable after a blocked deal, even if the target later finds
another acquirer, 57 and compensates shareholders for the
costs of delays or a busted deal. Related to any fee provision
will be the efforts covenant: requiring the acquirer to reach
some standard of effort in complying with a CFIUS
regulatory requirement for closing.58
A survey of merger agreements shows a spectrum of
CFIUS-related termination fees and efforts clauses. In
offered a 3% termination fee in the event their bid failed to
clause that included a commitment to making necessary
divestitures.59 The ambiguity of the termination fee clause,
and in particular its relationship to CFIUS action, resulted in
litigation.60 Target boards should thus take heed and make
such clauses explicit. In 2014, Siemens agreed to a 5%
reverse termination fee in the event CFIUS rejected its
planned acquisition of Dresser-Rand, as well as a wideobligations.61
SuccessFactors, the parties required reasonable best efforts
but also included an explicit limitation on obligations to
57

In re Chateaugay Corp., 198 B.R. 848, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See, e.g., Dale Collins, Sample Antitrust-Related
Provisions in M&A Agreements, ANTITRUST UNPACKED:
ANTITRUST
LAW
BLOG
17
(Apr.
27,
2013),
http://www.antitrustunpacked.com/siteFiles/BlogPosts/antitrust_ris
k_shifting4_27_2013.pdf.
59
Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among Diamond
II Holdings, Inc., Diamond II Acquisition Corp., and 3Com Corp.,
filed as Exhibit 2.1 to Form 8-K/A by 3Com, Inc. (Sept. 28, 2007).
The
clause is at §6.1(b); the termination fee is at
§8.3(c)(iii).
60
3Com Corporation v. Diamond II Holdings, Inc., C.A. No.
3933-VCN, 2010 WL 2280734 (May 31, 2010) (case relating to
discovery dispute over certain communications relating to the
purpose of the termination fee).
61
Siemens Energy Inc., Dynamo Acquisition Corp. & DresserRand Group, Inc., Agreement and Plan for Merger 35 (Sept. 21,
5.6(b).
58

63
make divestitures. 62 In the Shanghui-Smithfield transaction
described above, the parties explicitly excluded CFIUS risk
from the reverse termination fee.63 On the other hand, they
included a best efforts clause for regulatory compliance, as
64

More recently in the Fairchild deal, the board rejected a
4.3% reverse termination fee as insufficient, even though the
foreign consortium had also offered a hell or high water
CFIUS covenant.65 In its ongoing acquisition of Ingram
Micro, Tianjin offered a 6.7% reverse termination fee if the
deal was rejected by CFIUS, despite the initial choice not to
notify CFIUS.66 This suggests some tension between the
parties with regard to the best approach: a high termination
fee implies Ingram saw a need for protection against
regulatory action, while the public decision not to seek
CFIUS review suggested that Tianjin was initially confident
CFIUS would not be interested in the deal. The recent
It is hard to discern a pattern in these agreements; perhaps
because the parties are allocating not only the risks of their
particular deal but also risks due to unpredictable, shifting
political tensions. It appears from this small sample that
higher reverse termination fees are correlated with a greater
likelihood of success, thus suggesting confidence on the part
of the acquirer.
Quantifying the value of a strong efforts clause is made
more difficult by the lack of strong case law on what various
62

SAP America, Inc., Saturn Expansion Corp., &
SuccessFactors, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger 51,53 (Dec. 3,
5.5(a) and the explicit non-divestiture clauses within § 5.5(h).
63
See Smithfield Foods, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement
(Schedule 14A) 154, § 8.03(e) (May 28, 2013).
64
Id. at 139 40
that require the party to take any and all actions necessary to
accomplish the objective. See, e.g., Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc.
v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 756 (Del. Ch. 2008).
65
Fairchild Semicon
supra note 28.
66
Ingram Micro Inc., Current Report: Entry into a Material
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64
efforts such standards require. 67 For this reason, targets are
likely to require a significant and robust reverse termination
example of a board explaining why a mid-range (4.3%) fee
plus a strong efforts clause is insufficient, even with a pricing
premium to the domestic alternative.68
Are there risks associated with strong efforts clauses and
termination fees? In the antitrust context, one study suggests
effects from hell or high water clauses: the antitrust
authorities are more likely to take notice of an agreement with
such a clause (the signaling effect), and the parties will have
less negotiating leverage with the government if they are
bound to undertake divestitures or other major actions (the
bargaining effect).69
While similar effects may exist in the CFIUS context, the
Committee has greater freedom than the antitrust authorities
to investigate and require mitigation. Thus, while a foreign
acquirer may be signaling CFIUS and lowering its bargaining
power through voluntary notification and efforts clauses, it is
still probably wise to work with the authorities to assuage
their concerns.

C. MITIGATION
A strong efforts clause is important because CFIUS
approval may be conditioned on a variety of mitigation
measures. At first blush, mitigation appears to be required
67
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65
relatively rarely; CFIUS reports only 8% of cases from 2012
to 2014 required mitigation. 70 This statistic is somewhat
misleading, however, because it is based on all covered
transactions, and the definition of a covered transaction is
quite broad; a more useful data point is nearly 22% of all
investigated transactions required mitigation measures in
2013.71 CFIUS can require a variety of mitigation measures
ranging from passive ownership through proxy boards staffed
only by U.S. citizens, to active ownership with informationsharing restrictions between the parent and the domestic
corporation.72
CFIUS does not disclose specific mitigation
requirements in approved deals, but a review of several recent
deals gives a sense of the spectrum of what can be required.
sovereign wealth fund invested in Citibank. To allay any
fears over the investment
hardly a trivial concern given the
furor over the Dubai Ports World deal a year earlier
the
fund confirmed that it would not be involved in the
management or operation of Citibank.73
approval for its acquisition of Nexen Inc. in 2013, 74
contingent on compliance with mitigation requirements.
According to a leaked e-mail, the mitigation measures
-making
75
authority on Gulf Coast oil projects. In contrast to the
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Citibank deal, CNOOC would still be able to have a partial
role in the operation of the company. 76
Foreign investors acquiring particularly sensitive assets
may also use Proxy Agreements and Special Security
Arrangements (SSA). 77
The
Italian company
a
U.S. defense contractor, illustrates these alternatives. 78 A
subsidiary with a proxy board arrangement is used to address
the most serious, top-secret contracts.79 The parent can only
review financial information and generally takes a passive
role.80 For those operations involving secret level clearances
(and below), Finmeccanica set up a U.S. subsidiary with an
SSA: a board comprised of three outside directors (all U.S.
citizens) and two inside directors (one of whom was a U.S.
citizen). 81 There are additional information security
requirements and both subsidiaries are expected to be
financially independent.82
The specific mitigation measures required appears to be
based on the type of threat CFIUS may perceive. 83 Boards of
companies involved in sensitive national security or critical
infrastructure businesses may want to consider proposing
proxy or SSA arrangements proactively, as
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framework may be a useful guide here. SSAs and proxy
arrangements appear to be most appropriate for the second and third
types of threats in his taxonomy).

67
opposed to passively or retroactively, in their notice to CFIUS
to show their goodwill. Even if the parties do not propose such
measures, they may be forced to accept them.84 For exchange
offers in which shareholders will continue to own a stake in
the merged company, the target board should carefully
evaluate how ongoing compliance with these intrusive
governance requirements might impact the value of the
company going forward.

V. CONCLUSION
While foreign investors grow increasingly concerned
expand its role to address concerns over the state of the United
and susceptibility to espionage. 85 As the deals discussed in
this article show, boards of American companies should
watch this debate carefully because it will influence not only
the willingness of foreign investors to make acquisition
proposals but also the tactics with which these domestic
boards respond.
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